The Washington Times, Sunday, September 8,
After former President Clinton's historical visit to Vietnam before leaving office, he asserted that Vietnam's "new chapter," its economy becoming more integrated with the rest of the world, was on a "virtually irreversible" road to greater prosperity and political freedom.
And the growing economic relations, like the Bilateral Trade Agreement that recently went into effect, between the United States and Vietnam would speed up these "peaceful revolutions," which would also be beneficial for American businesses. This view is held by many in Washington, including U.S. Senators John Kerry, Massachusetts Democrat, and John McCain, Arizona Republican-both former Vietnam veterans.
This is why both senators have recently prevented a House Bill-that would restrict nonhumanitarian aid unless Vietnam made progress in human rights-from Senate's consideration; and why a month earlier the House of Representatives rejected a bill that would derail Vietnam trade relations renewal.
However, as noted by David Lamb's Vietnam, Now, interpreting Vietnam is "like peeling the skin of an onion: You went deeper, layer by layer, but never got to the core." In fact contrary to the common view, the stop-go cycle of doi moi (economic reforms) and the short-lived coi moi (political reforms) by the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) since the mid-1980s illustrate that the Vietnam government was not, and is not, interested in becoming the next "Asian Tiger." Instead, the VCP's motivation to reform is to maintain its political monopoly. This appears to be, and probably has always been, the core of the party.
For the VCP, not enough reform creates social instability that would challenge its legitimacy, but too much reform can do the same. Thus, the VCP has made, unmade, and remade reforms since the mid-1980s in order to control social instability.
This stop-go cycle, however, will inevitably disappoint American businesses again-many U.S. businesses pulled out of Vietnam in the mid-1990s during a broad reversion to doi moi earlier phases. It will also again disappoint the aspirations of Vietnam's young, industrious population who yearns for more freedom and more capital.
From 1975 to 1986, Vietnam was virtually living in the "dark-ages." Its state-own enterprises were losing money, food was rationed, and shoes needed to be rationed. These crises drove the party leadership to reform in order to pump up legitimacy. Doi moi was to encourage small private enterprise among Vietnamese, so they could feed and clothe themselves. Coi moi was to give Vietnamese more political freedom, so they could coax the entrenched communist bureaucracy to carry out doi moi. Neither reforms were retreats from dictatorship but were deliberate, cautious and practical attempts to make a more efficient dictatorship in response to a new economic world order.
However, after witnessing the Tiananmen Square massacre, the VCP realized that it could not afford to open itself up to public self-criticism and ended coi moi. But some degree of self-criticism is allowed within the party. In fact, known dissidents are often party members such as the late general Tran Do who called for "a true democracy." Nonetheless, any challenge to the VCP has been, and will be, "silenced" as was Tran Do's 83-page manuscript about life in Vietnam before his death in early August 2002.
In the case of doi moi, it was continued until the mid-1990s. "The rages to riches" that resulted from doi moi brought about "social evils" that the leadership thought a reversion was needed, which resulted "the riches to rages." Now emerging from the region financial crisis, the VCP is ready for another stop-go cycle of reforms.
The VCP, to its credit, has confused many observers about the recent phenomenon of the marriage between communism and capitalism, particularly of which is the stronger partner. Neither is. Rather, it is about sustaining political power. Overall, the VCP is making its dictatorship more economically and politically efficient, as well as more integrated, in the global economy. That has drawn adequate foreign investments and found trade-partners for its exported goods, and whose citizens have been better off relative to the first ten years after the war. All are to shore up its legitimacy.
At the same time, however, the VCP is further strangling the development of the country's "social capital"-the ability of people to trust, debate, compromise and respect for differences with each other that creates capitalism and produces democracy. This is done by barring ideas and arresting individuals that call for such development, and by withholding individuals' unalienable rights. All are to safeguard against "peaceful revolutions."
These trends are the paradox of today's Vietnam. And this is why Vietnam is the best-worst country. It no longer lives in the dark-ages, but it will remain one of the poorest countries in the world.
The late economist Mancur Olson observed that America continued economic power, unlike dictatorships of any form, lies in its respect for individual rights. Vietnam will never have growth in the long run until individual rights are respected. There is a consensus among human rights watch groups, including the U.S. State Department, that human rights are a problem in Vietnam and, perhaps, have gotten worse in recent years.
At a time when the Vietnam government is willing to make reform, America is better off having annual conditional Vietnam trade relations renewal. This will more likely lower U.S. investment risks in Vietnam, make sure Vietnam exported goods meet U.S. standards, and facilitate some changes in Vietnam's human rights record up-front rather than expecting "returns" somewhere down the line.
If not, Vietnam will walk away with the benefits when it has enough of reform, since most of the initial benefits of the trade agreements will go to Vietnam, and that there are no real sanctions for Vietnam to implement those agreements.
LONG LE
Assistant professor,
political science
California State University-Bakersfield