Analysis:
Difficult Year Ahead for Vietnam's Communist Party

The political landscape facing the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is getting ever more severe: The party faces growing dissent from within as conscientious members are demanding greater accountability, more democracy and, in some cases, an end to one-party rule altogether. At the same time, popular unrest is mounting, especially in the countryside, among religious groups, and from students. These pressures come as the economy is faltering and outside demands for reforms-both economic and political-are heating up. Underlying these trends is the ever tighter cooperation and linkages between democratic forces inside and outside the country.

Taking a look at each of these developments in turn:

The Party currently has two million members. Many are opportunists, driven by power and privilege. But within the ranks are an increasing number of conscientious members with the courage to speak out. Perhaps these individuals were initially attracted to the Party for its promises of national independence and liberation, but today they have come to realize and regret the political reality which has emerged. Their criticisms come on two fronts.

Individuals such as retired general Tran Do question the basic tenets of the communist system and conclude that democratic reforms are absolutely necessary. For example, in the first installment of his memoirs written in September 1998, Tran Do ponders the notions of class struggle and centralized democracy. Class struggle, Tran Do observes, has caused terrible social divisions and discrimination, denying qualified people the opportunity to make important contributions. At the same time, centralized democracy and related ideas of party discipline have mandated total obedience, stifling personal liberty and creativity.

Coming from the onetime ideology chief of the party, these views have considerable influence, especially when Tran Do concludes that Marxism-Leninism is an outdated ideology and the only way out for Vietnam is "democracy, democracy, more democracy!" He acknowledges: "Our present life, it seems, is less and less like what we dreamt of building, and more and more like what we had spent time overthrowing."
 

Alongside the basic critiques against the political system, other party dissidents have targeted the very individuals leading the regime. Over the last year, an unprecedented number of open letters have been released charging corruption in the highest places. Those charged include a deputy prime minister, several cabinet ministers, the vice-mayor of Hanoi, and even a member of the all powerful politburo. Not only were the officials mentioned by name, but the accusers also took the equally unprecedented step of attaching their own names and addressees to their petitions.

These criticisms from within the Party combine to undermine the legitimacy of the VCP as well as the authority of its leaders. This an especially troubling challenge for the new Hanoi leadership which has been in power for just over a year. The current triumvirate of Le Kha Phieu (party general secretary), Tran Duc Luong (state president), and Phan Van Khai (prime minister) lacks the illustrious revolutionary credentials of its predecessors. All in their 60s, the three men played essentially no role in the struggle for independence against the French and were only mid-level cadres during the war against the South. In fact, the current party chief, Le Kha Phieu, had served as a regimental commander under general Tran Do. Consequently, short on revolutionary stature, the current leadership cannot command the unquestioned authority of past leaders and is thus struggling to cement its control over the Party.

Beyond its own members, the communist leadership faces increasing pressure from other quarters. Since major rural unrest swept Vietnam in 1997, other protests have followed. In Nam Dinh province in May 1998, in the village of Tho Da just 15 kilometers outside Hanoi in October, and elsewhere farmers have demonstrated against illegal land confiscation and government corruption. In Tho Do, villagers battled riot police for the second time in order to maintain the usage rights to their land. The growing willingness of farmers to defend their interests and to act collectively are worrisome signs for the VCP which views the peasantry as the bedrock of its power.

1998 also witnessed demonstrations by students at the Van Lang School of Law located in Saigon after the government cancelled final examinations citing a shortage of funds. At about the same time as the Van Lang demonstrations, an underground newspaper called "Restlessness" (Thao Thuc) emerged. Calling itself the voice of Vietnamese youths, "Restlessness" came out with three issues and was widely distributed inside Vietnam.

Related to the potential for greater popular unrest is the state of the economy. The perennial problems of corruption and red tape have caused foreign investment to decrease by over half since the peak in 1995. The decrease in foreign investment has led to a slowdown in economic growth and a balance of payments crisis as hard currency receipts have correspondingly dropped. A political consequence of the economic downturn is that Hanoi urgently needs to improve its ties with Western countries to attract more aid and investment to stave off further crisis. The release of several thousand prisoners, including some well known political prisoners, in September and November of 1998, was indeed driven by Hanoi's need to polish its image abroad.

The prisoner releases highlight both the effectiveness of international pressure and the extent to which this pressure has increased. On the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many elected officials and human rights activists met in Brussels and from their conference formed the "International Council for Democracy in Vietnam." One of the co-founders, French Senator Michel Pelchat announced the Council would aim, among other projects, to lobby the United Nations, the European Union, and ASEAN to exert greater pressure on the Hanoi government to respect human rights.

In the United States, members of the House of Representatives launched a "Campaign to Adopt-a-Voice of Conscience in Vietnam." The campaign initiated by the Congressional Dialogue on Vietnam involves Members of Congress advocating for Vietnamese currently in prison, under house arrest, or otherwise persecuted for the peaceful expression of their beliefs. The goal is to achieve the freedom of these voices of conscience, while at the same time drawing attention to the lack of freedom of expression in Vietnam.

These outside pressures for political reform, coupled with the constant urgings by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for Hanoi to enact real economic reform, are making it harder for the Vietnamese communists to get away with the status quo. Perhaps the greatest threat to this status quo is the linkages which have been achieved by Vietnamese democratic forces from within and outside the country. One way to gauge this cooperation is to look at both the distribution, frequency, and content of recent writings by dissidents.

Whereas letters, articles, and petitions used to take several months (or years) before they were brought overseas, the lag time has been shortened considerably to a few weeks and sometimes even less. Often times, channels from inside Vietnam to the outside, and back to Vietnam, have become the most effective for disseminating underground publications. More and more, a document by one dissident will mention and offer agreement with the ideas published by several other dissidents. In this way, important views do not slip quietly into oblivion and implicit associations are forming. Equally importantly, these linkages have reached across different social strata, geographical regions, and even past political leanings. Finally, the writings themselves have started to carry multiple signatories.

The reaction of the Vietnamese communists to these trends have been a mixture of concern, paralysis, and repression. On a regular basis, the leadership issues stern warnings against the "peaceful evolution" undertaken by so-called subversive forces. Yet on the issues requiring peaceful changes, such as political openness, an end to corruption, reform of the bloated state sector, the leadership has no constructive solutions. It has chosen instead to try to silence the voices for change.

In the current international climate, the Hanoi government no longer arrests democracy activists outright. The show trials and stiff jail sentences of the recent past would attract too much unwelcome attention. As a result, the government enforces a decree on "administrative detainment" (Directive 31/CP) which allows the security forces to confine individuals for up to two years without trials and without specifying any charge. Individuals currently under "administrative detainment" include biologist Ha Si Phu, journalist Bui Minh Quoc, and writer Bao Cu.

While the leadership of the VCP can order the detainment of any dissident without cause, it is the leadership which has become the most isolated. This isolation is not only from society, but more and more also from within the ranks of the Communist Party itself. The year ahead will indeed be a difficult one for Vietnam's communists.


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